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THE BOURNE TRAGEDY: 
LOST SUBJECTS OF THE BIOCONVERGENT AGE 
 
DEBBIE EPSTEIN & DEBORAH LYNN STEINBERG 
 
 
Between the desire 
And the spasm 
Between the potency 
And the existence 
Between the essence 
And the descent 
—T.S. Eliot (1925) 
 
Introduction 
Jason Bourne, the protagonist of the Bourne trilogy of films released between 
2002 and 2007, embodies the equivocal characteristics of a postmodern, 
disenchanted and melancholic age. He is in some ways a classic tragic hero, 
here at the mercy of clandestine governmentality, surveillant geopolitics, and 
the encroaching sweep of technology—the late modern variant of the Fates and 
Gods. And he is fatally flawed in the manner of the Shakespearean tragic hero 
whose anguished dilemma is set in motion by his own character and actions. As 
we show in this paper, Bourne’s tragedy is, at least in part, his embodiment of 
these irreconcilable subject positions, which also constitute a tragic dilemma of 
the bioconvergent age. 
In this paper, we examine the Bourne trilogy to explore three themes. 
First, we consider the imagined and actual interfaces of bioconvergence—of 
body, gadgetry, and electronic communications. We explore the ways in which 
the bioconvergent tendencies represented in and by Bourne reflect and cultivate 
a cultural unconscious deeply seduced by and imbricated in surveillant 
governmentality. Second, we consider the ways in which the trilogy achieves its 
effects through the deployment of both hyperrealism and verisimilitude. In this 
context, we explore the filmic interpellation of audiences into a fantasy of
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omnipotence and omni-science, on the one hand, and the underlying phantasy1 
of a zero-sum world that uncouples morality from affect, on the other. Thus, we 
consider the ways in which Bourne articulates two interlinked phenomena—a 
distinctively American romance with the sociopathic/heroic subject and a 
paranoid, dystopic world that is and seems seductively real. Our third theme is 
the Bourne journey through an obsessional spiral of paranoia, action and 
reaction. Here we explore the trilogy as a social description of the expulsive 
and retentive tendencies of the bioconvergent age, where the demand for 
instantaneity drives out all other considerations (morality, reason, connection) 
and where the lost subject, in his interminable quest for himself, remains lost. 
In the next section we outline our particular approach to media analysis, 
which draws on social semiotics, cultural theory, and cultural psychoanalysis. 
Moving into the main body of our argument, we begin with a brief 
consideration of the key theme of this special issue—bioconvergence and what 
we describe in this paper as the bioconvergent age. We then turn to a close 
reading of the trilogy. We consider the automatonic character of Bourne as a 
site of power and loss. We then move to the themes of iteration and 
perseveration. Here we interrogate the narrative arc of the Bourne saga in which 
he always ends where he began and must begin again. Thus, the Bourne journey 
is a melancholic, perpetual re-enactment of trauma. We argue that the trilogy 
provides a touchstone for a melancholic cultural unconscious. We then explore 
the question of paranoia and the affective and epistemic dimensions of paranoid 
governmentality and instantaneity, with their telescoping of time and 
imperative. We conclude the paper by returning to our title, The Bourne 
Tragedy, to bring our argument together in a consideration of bioconvergence’s 
seductions and its lost subjects and subjectivities. 
 
Specularity, Social Signification, and the Cultural Unconscious 
In her early work, Laura Mulvey (1975) argued that film provides a potent 
window on the patriarchal unconscious of a culture. Our longer-term project 
has been to build on this proposition, both by broadening the political 
considerations that fill out a “cultural unconscious” and by unpacking a wider 
array of component characteristics that underpin the relationship between media 
representations and their immediate cultural moments. What we are developing 
                                                
1 In this paper we use both spellings of f/phantasy. Where we begin the word with ‘f’ we are 
referring to the more commonsense meanings of the term as something imagined, a story. 
“Phantasy,” in the psychoanalytic sense, refers to the underlying, unconscious investment in a 
surface fantasy. See, for example, Juliet Mitchell’s (1986) explanation.  
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further through this analysis of the Bourne films is a version of social semiotics 
that draws on particular strands of cultural and psychoanalytic theory. 
First, we are interested in what we have termed elsewhere “the 
materiality of signification” (Epstein and Steinberg 2007: 4)—that is, the way 
that signification materializes and is materialized by historically located, 
embodied, and agentic practices as well as representational conventions of 
genre, trope, and text. A dimension of this is what Steinberg, elsewhere, has 
termed “filling-in”: 
“Filling-in” … along with spectacle, plays a part in forging what 
might be termed the affective-epistemic contract between film 
and film-viewer. To a significant degree, cinematic signification 
deals in narrative and semiotic fragments which are then filled in 
by the viewer…. [T]he more recognizable the fragment (the 
more commonsense it is), the more easily the audience can fill in 
the rest. (Steinberg 2009: 5; original emphasis) 
This tells us something of the ways in which audiences invest affectively in 
particular moments or modes of representation and also something of the 
preferred knowledges and affectivities accruing to what might be termed the 
interpretive contract between text and audience. Thus, what audiences fill in 
occupies a terrain of (yearned for) familiarity, constituted both by knowledge 
and desire. In Bourne, these are explicit themes: these are films about filling-in. 
Indeed, there is a verisimilitude in the labours of Bourne as protagonist that 
mirrors the work of audienceship; both are bound in a compact born of 
spectacular loss, the seductions of technology, and the tensions and 
apprehensions of a totalizing political power. Consequently, we are able to find 
in the Bourne trilogy an insight into both the commonsense purchase, and the 
intimate effects, of paranoid governmentality. 
Our second interest is in the operations of biopower and the 
bioconvergent body-ethic. In this context we draw on and interrogate a number 
of cultural theoretical perspectives concerned with governmentality (Nadesan 
2008; Rose 1999 [2nd edition]), the production of post-cyborg subjectivities 
(Haraway 1991), and the iterative, embodied dimensions of the political realm 
(Butler 1993, 2009). These critical tools allow us to interrogate the films’ 
depiction of the interface of bodies, technology, and representation—and what 
this means for subjectivity. 
Psychoanalytic theory provides our final critical resource. In this 
context, we wish to develop Mulvey’s understanding of the culturally 
sedimented character of spectacle and scopophilic desire. Our use of the notion 
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of a “cultural unconscious” thus also draws on and departs significantly from 
Jung’s (1991) structuralist notion of the collective unconscious, that is, the 
symbolic/archetypal imaginary distinctive of the human species that organizes 
and makes sense of human experience. The notion of a cultural unconscious 
posits a collective imaginary (operating at both conscious and intrapsychic 
levels) that is constituted through and subject to cultural practice, social 
relations, and representation. 
The Bourne films offer an intimate portrait of the intrapsychic as well as 
social/representational subject position. We argue that Jason Bourne stands in 
for the troubled subject of a wider culture and a wider cultural moment. For this 
reason, a psychoanalytic reading of the character of Bourne and of the 
signification regimes of the films offers us the opportunity to explore two 
further aspects of the bioconvergent age: the role of narcissism in the neoliberal 
era and the place of mourning and not mourning2 —melancholia—in the 
political realm. 
There are, of course, frictions among the frameworks we bring together 
here. On the one hand, we have a set of concepts drawn, in the main, from 
Freudian and Kleinian psychoanalysis (phantasy, melancholia, fetish, repetition 
compulsion, and so forth), and on the other, a set drawn from positions that 
either reject psychoanalysis (e.g., Foucauldian governmentality theory) or have 
an ambivalent relationship to it (e.g., Butler). Bringing these resources together 
thus introduces some tensions. For example, a Kleinian account of unconscious 
phantasy implies a different kind of subject from the one envisaged by Foucault 
or Butler, who conceptualize personhood in different ways. We suggest that 
these tensions are productive, allowing us to understand subjectivity, social 
relations, and signification from distinct and unusual vantage points. Thus, for 
example, they allow us to consider more fully the affective constitution of the 
social as well as the representational realm, and to map, and thus more 
persuasively explain, the intrapsychic purchase of particular governmentalities 
and biopolitical genealogies.3 
 
A Bioconvergent Age 
One of the underpinning assumptions of this special issue is that we are living 
in, or moving towards, a bioconvergent age. There are a number of distinctive 
                                                
2 The question of not mourning as a political as well as an intimate, intersubjective affect is 
discussed in Johnson (1999). 
3 We would like to thank Peter Redman for his comments, which have helped us think 
particularly about this section of the paper. 
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trajectories of social, technological, and political transformations that could be 
said to constitute this age4 and that are captured in the visual and narrative arcs 
of the Bourne trilogy, our central case study. 
Film itself, for example, is and has been from its inception, a 
bioconvergent medium. It is constituted by technical, organizational, and 
artistic infrastructures and institutions that bring together, inter alia, bodies, 
technology, markets, and representation. Within the medium of film, the 
political thriller as a genre has characteristically articulated dystopic social 
commentary with complex technologies and extraordinary feats of stunt work. 
These have frequently been deployed both as tropes of visual content and as 
film production method. Furthermore, the genre’s realist conceits have 
historically been achieved in part through the integration of live action with 
ordinary life. 
Digitalization has taken this consolidation to the next level. If we 
compare two similar scenes, one from North by Northwest (Hitchcock 1959), 
the other from Bourne Ultimatum, we can trace the intensifying bioconvergent 
capacities of the film industry. In North by Northwest, secret service agents 
pursue Cary Grant’s character through New York’s teeming Grand Central 
Station. This is a location shot given its aura of immediacy and claustrophobic 
realism by the use of the handheld camera and the integration of the main 
action into the normal melee of station life. In Ultimatum, Jason Bourne and the 
journalist he is meeting are pursued through Waterloo Station in London, not 
only by agents, but also remotely through CCTV surveillance cameras 
positioned throughout the cavernous building. One of the extra features on the 
Ultimatum DVD minutely traces the making of this scene. We are told that the 
surveillance cameras are not merely a plot device but are, in fact, the 
surveillance system of the actual station. The filmmakers got permission to use 
the CCTV system to produce visual sequences for the movie, which was at this 
point in the plot about the power of surveillance per se. Thus, even while the 
fantasy of pursuit by embodied human agents remains fictional in both films, 
the fantasy of total surveillance by remote technology in Ultimatum is entirely 
real. If the claustrophobia of an earlier age concerned clandestine intrusions into 
intimate space, by the time of Bourne the agency of this effect is distributed, 
                                                
4 We are not suggesting that bioconvergent trajectories are uniform in their distribution or 
totalizing in their praxes or effects. Bioconvergence is complexly subject to and in some 
respects has been unpredictably subversive or transformative of geopolitical inequalities, modes 
of governance, and political economy, as well as of modes of kinship and communication, 
interpersonal attachments, identity practices. 
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without the necessity of immediate presence and arguably all the stronger for 
that. 
Thus, a second trajectory of convergence is technology qua technology 
through the medium of digitality. We are living in a time of ever more complex 
and telescoped integrations of machines and systems (audio, visual, informatic, 
biotechnical) disseminated and consumed as the gadgetry of everyday life. 
Integrated technology has become a globalized locus of recognition, 
expectation, and commonsense, even in contexts where relatively few can avail 
themselves of it. It is a growing means and medium of globalization, effecting 
and reorganizing identifications, intersubjective relations, social movements, 
and the political landscape itself.5 Furthermore, technological integration is 
both the means for creating spectacle and is, in itself, spectacular in ways that 
rearticulate the field of scopophilic (and indeed audiophilic) desire and 
pleasure. The progressive integration of technology has heralded a transforming 
ecology of fetishized consumption, production, and capital. This process is 
graphically rendered in Bourne. The instruments of technological convergence 
(the computer, the cell phone, global positioning systems, even the old-
fashioned fax that appears to redeem the CIA in Ultimatum) appear 
“democratized” as the fetish objects of both pursuers and pursued, “assets” and 
“targets,” agents and incidental passers-by. 
The third trajectory is the imbrication of these technological tendencies 
in government and governmentality. This has particular salience on the terrain 
of institutions dealing in and deploying political paranoia. From the Cold War 
to the “war on terror,” from CCTV surveillance to biometric border controls, 
bioconvergent technology has transformed the panoptical and “thanatopolitical” 
(Murray 2006) potentialities of government as well as its more mundane 
disciplinary and regulative capacities. 
This leads us to the fourth trajectory of bioconvergence, the 
interpellation of the human subject into the convergent bio-ethic, with distinct 
imperatives of action, affect, and agency. It provides a reinvented trope of the 
weaponized human subject bent on saving (or destroying) himself and the 
world. Therein, as we shall see, lies the ambivalent object lesson of Jason 
Bourne. 
 
                                                
5 The Arab Spring of 2011, for example, relied on the use of digital communication through the 
technologies of social media. 
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The Bourne Phenomenon 
The Bourne films are loosely based on the political thrillers of Robert Ludlum.6 
While the novels are all set in the latter stages of the Cold War, the films track 
from the Cold War sensibility of The Bourne Identity (2002) to the post-9/11 
sensibility of The Bourne Supremacy (2004) and The Bourne Ultimatum (2007). 
The films star Matt Damon as Jason Bourne and include major actors: Albert 
Finney (Albert Hirsch), David Strathairn (Noah Vosen), and Joan Allen 
(Pamela Landy), as well as the less well-known Julia Stiles (Nicky Parsons) and 
well-known German actress, Franka Potente (Marie Helena Kreutz). The 
Bourne trilogy has been a particularly successful and profitable7 enterprise. 
Supremacy and Ultimatum have, between them, won a number of awards.8 All 
three films are frequently replayed9 on terrestrial and cable television. 
The central plot conceit is that Jason Bourne has traumatic amnesia. The 
trilogy begins with the potent imagery of a man, unconscious and adrift in a 
rough sea, his body, we later discover, is riddled with bullets. He is picked up 
by an Italian fishing boat and revived, upon which he is immediately thrust into 
the primary motif of all three films—his unremitting, hypervigilant search for 
his “real” identity. 
The films track three key plot trajectories. The first concerns Jason 
Bourne and our (his) emerging knowledge of himself. While he cannot 
remember anything about his previous life, we (and he) discover that he has 
embodied knowledges, reflexes, and abilities that verge on the superhuman. He 
has virtually no self-knowledge and yet is omniscient; he is sympathetic and yet 
will switch instantaneously into a mode of extreme and effective violence; he is 
one man cast adrift, and yet a prime mover within a maelstrom of corruption, 
international intrigue, and conflict. Finally, he is dissociated, yet anchored to 
reality not simply by the very real danger to which he is constantly subjected, 
but through his accidental meeting, in Identity, and growing relationship with 
Marie, his helpmeet and internalized good object. It is this relationship—even 
after she is killed at the beginning of Supremacy—that hauntologically10 
                                                
6 The trilogy comprises The Bourne Identity (1980), The Bourne Supremacy (1986), and The 
Bourne Ultimatum (1990). 
7 According to Wikipedia the films’ profits have, so far, tripled the cost of making them. 
8 Both films won best picture at the Empire Awards and Ultimatum won three Academy 
Awards, including for best editing. 
9 During the writing of this paper, one or another of the Bourne films were screened on 
Canadian cable stations with notable regularity. 
10 The concept of “hauntology” comes from Derrida (1994).  
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signifies the possibility of redemption, both of Bourne and, symbolically, of the 
world. 
The second plot trajectory concerns the world order surrounding Jason 
Bourne, which is in the decompensating throes of late capitalism and 
neoconservative governmentality. Bourne’s is the drama of the singular, 
alienated, (un)common man in a struggle against a totalizing (if not totalitarian) 
state and, simultaneously, a parable about the seductive unreason of political as 
well as personal paranoia. 
The third is a projection of visual spectacle and time. The scene 
constantly and instantaneously shifts between world cities: London, Paris, 
Zurich, Madrid, Marrakesh, New York. True to the contemporary mode of the 
political thriller, the films are in virtually constant motion cutting from car 
chases to crashes to fight sequences. This is particularly the case in Ultimatum. 
Even in moments of pause, there is the sense of menace, anxiety, and a 
gathering storm. These slower-paced scenes are disturbed by Bourne’s visible 
hypervigilance, the pulse rate of the accompanying music, and the generic 
expectation of fast, “unexpected” action. Moreover, the span of the three films 
tracks the progressive integration, consolidation, and convergence of complex 
technologies and communication systems. Indeed, the films portray visually 
and through their plot the development and ubiquitous sedimentation of digital 
communication and smart technology. We witness the bulky, inelegant, 
flickering computer terminals of Identity resolve into flat screen aesthetics and 
the Motorola RZR cell phone, the primary and ubiquitous fetish object of 
Ultimatum. There is, thus, a powerfully evocative verisimilitude between the 
evolving capacities of surveillance and information gathering and their 
portrayals. In earlier action films, such as the James Bond series,11 hyperbolic 
gadgetry was presented with irony and humour; in Bourne, the technology is 
dystopically “real.” 
 
Automatonics 
“You’re a malfunctioning $30,000,000 
weapon.” (Ted Conklin, Head of 
Treadstone, The Bourne Identity 2000) 
In 1960, Clynes and Kline (1960) introduced the notion of the cyborg, which, in 
an optimistic, modernist reading, they understood as machine enhanced 
humanity. As an integration of machine and man (sic), the cyborg, from this 
                                                
11 The DVD cover for Ultimatum has the strap line, “Move over 007, Bourne is back.” 
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standpoint, represented the augmentation of embodied reach, power, and 
capacity. This idealized version of the cyborg differs somewhat from the ways 
in which the cyborg has been taken up in popular culture. Here, typically, the 
cyborg’s enhancement heralds a particular kind of dilemma as superlative 
power threatens to uncouple subjective personhood from its intersubjective and 
intrapsychic moorings. The cyborg dilemma is of the human being whose 
hybridization with technology threatens the loss of (usually) his humanity. 
Significantly, the dilemma does not go the other way. The machine typically 
does not mourn its loss as it is humanized.12 Star Trek TNG’s character Data, 
the Terminator, Yod in Marge Piercy’s novel He, She and It (1993)13 are all 
framed in this anthropomorphic, anthropophilic mode of yearning. The cyborg 
imperative, in some renditions, may be to annihilate humanity, but its 
underlying impetus is almost invariably to find its humanity or to rescue the 
humanity of others. The cyborg, in this context, is an outlying figure of self-
mourning; its tragedy lies in its inability to become fully human and its 
ultimately irresistible drive to sacrifice itself in order to save humanity.14 
In her landmark essay, Donna Haraway (1991) argued that in late 
modernity we are all cyborgs as the interface with technology is ubiquitous and 
virtually inescapable. Moreover, the cyborg for Haraway is an altogether more 
contrary and ironic kind of outlier—one that does not mourn its humanity, but 
revels in and is self-aware of its potentiality to disrupt the dominant order. 
Haraway’s cyborg is the illegitimate child of the patriarchal, imperialist 
institutions that produced it. For Haraway, the cyborg is able to overturn the 
                                                
12 An interesting exception is the character of Seven of Nine from Star Trek Voyager, whose 
subversive (and seductive) ambivalence is her continuing attachment to the imperialist Borg 
who took her captive, as formerly human, and assimilated her capacities to their own. Seven of 
Nine is visually presented as a classic cyborg—an enhanced articulation of machine and human. 
While the crew who rescue her attempt to restore her to human, they find that she cannot 
survive without a measure of her cyborg circuitry. Thus Seven of Nine is (and can be) only 
partially returned to humanity. However, her yearning, insofar as she has the capacity to feel it, 
is not entirely human and not, as with the earlier character Data, abject. Self-possessed and self-
aware, she is drawn to, and mourns in, both directions. It is never clear what counts, for her, as 
her true home (as Borg or as human) as she rides, in some measure a captive herself, on the lost 
Voyager’s unremitting journey back to earth.  
13 In the UK, this novel has the title Body of Glass.  
14 A related dilemma also emerges in this frame of cyborg representation, which is the 
contestation between the humanized and dehumanized cyborg. In the Terminator films, for 
example, there is a population of outlier cyborgs, an army gone rogue. In this frame, the cyborg 
has malfunctioned. It is redeemed by the recuperation of its purpose (to serve and save humans) 
by one of its own number. What is disturbing, then, about the machine-human hybrid is its 
latent tendency, always threatening even at its most docile, to displace its subordination to and 
sublimation of human will, including where that will is to kill other humans. 
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dominant, thus resolving the dilemma of the human outlier (in particular, the 
gendered outlier).15 She writes: 
Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of dualisms 
in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to 
ourselves. This is a dream not of a common language, but of a 
powerful infidel heteroglossia. It is an imagination of a feminist 
speaking in tongues to strike fear into the circuits of the 
supersavers of the new right. It means both building and 
destroying machines, identities, categories, relationships, space 
stories. Though both are bound in the spiral dance, I would 
rather be a cyborg than a goddess. (p. 182) 
Jason Bourne can be read as embodying the characteristics of both of these 
versions of the cyborg. He is superlatively enhanced. He is multiglossic—
speaking every language he encounters indistinguishably from a native speaker. 
His physical prowess in combat, whether in the use of weaponry or hand to 
hand, is accelerated, indefatigable, and undefeatable. While not knowing 
himself, he is at the same time omniscient, always knowing the ways in and out, 
the hiding places, the labyrinthine articulations of every building in every city. 
Functionally, he is a global positioning unit, a central intelligence, a distributed 
agent. He is also rogue. He exists in an anomic limbo, yearning towards yet dis-
integrated from his full humanity. At the same time, he is anarchic, a rogue 
agent born of and from a corrupt agency. Thus, he also bespeaks Haraway’s 
“powerful infidel heteroglossia.” 
Yet Jason Bourne is also not a cyborg. Both his amnesia and 
hypermenesia are artefacts of an automatized (and atomized) humanity that 
does not graphically articulate body and machine. His bodily prowess is all 
flesh, conditioned. Like the other assassins of the CIA’s Treadstone project, 
Bourne is everywhere and nowhere, an unmoored being, an (un)free agent. 
Treadstone assassins are not assimilated; they are used, reduced, evacuated 
subjects, sleeper cells waiting for technologized activation, external to 
themselves, of their purpose. 
This is not precisely a cyborg fantasy; it is instead a bioconvergent 
fantasy, an edifying and dystopic tale of what happens to human beings when 
they are captured, activated, and transformed in the network of technology but 
are not themselves hybrids of machine and body—notwithstanding that psyche 
                                                
15 Ripley, in Aliens 2, is Haraway’s cyborg. In the final conflagration of the movie, as she 
integrates herself into the machine to fight the alien, it is a triumphal moment of revelry, 
superhumanity, and, significantly, the reversal of the gender order. 
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and soma are mechanized, technologized, and mediatized. If the classic cyborg 
fantasy only goes one way—the yearning towards humanness—the 
bioconvergent fantasy goes both ways—towards and away from humanness—
as the drama takes place almost entirely on the terrain of the human. Bourne’s 
is not the cyborg’s but the automaton’s dilemma. 
In the Bourne trilogy, the Treadstone assassins are referred to as 
“assets.”16 What makes them assets is their capacity to be animated via 
technology in an instant, given a mission to kill their “target(s)” and then return 
to their previous, quiescent state without qualm, hesitation or morality. They 
are willingly and wilfully automatonic, their agency confined to the method of 
murder, their reflexes instantaneously lethal and their bodies hardened. Indeed, 
they are without affect17 and without pain. 
The automaton’s dilemma is, in part, that of the weaponized human, 
yearning towards his superordinacy as much as defeated or disorientated by it; 
and yearning at the same time towards his humanity as much as wanting to 
repudiate the equivocal nature of being. This phantasy of omnipotence is that 
the expansive character of humanity and the repudiative character of 
automatonics can be reconciled in the same body and person. 
 
Iterations 
Perseveration: [pur′səәvəәrā′shəәn] 
Etymology: L, persevero, to persist …  
[T]he involuntary and pathologic 
persistence of the same verbal response or 
motor activity regardless of the stimulus or 
its duration.  
(Mosby’s Medical Dictionary, 2009) 
In Bodies that Matter, Judith Butler (1993) sets out her theory of performativity 
and iterative effects. Focusing on what she terms the “heterosexual matrix,” she 
makes a twofold argument. The first is that gender and sex are not separate, but 
are the linked products of discourse.18 That is, gender is not a cultural artefact 
                                                
16 The use of the term “assets” for operatives of this nature is not limited to the Bourne trilogy, 
but is characteristic of the wider spy/thriller genre. 
17 Most of the “assets” are also solitary. Only two appear “in the world” (one with a child and 
the other in a board meeting). The others appear only alone, either waiting in an anonymous 
hotel room, with few possessions and no other interests, for a call to action, or in the midst of 
action. 
18 This was Butler’s central argument in the earlier book Gender Trouble (1990). 
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imposed on the biologically sexed body. Rather, sex and gender emerge 
inseparably from discursive practices (bodies of knowledge, operations of 
power and regimes of truth).19 Second, she argues that gender/sex become 
embodied and materialized through the reiteration of performative practices.20 
In this way, Butler retheorized our understanding of the relationship not only 
between gender, sex, and the body, but also between representation and 
materiality. 
The Bourne films are iterative in a number of different ways. First, re-
iteration is the central motif of the series. Visually, this is played out in constant 
and nearly identical fight scenes; chases (on foot, by car, by moped); tropes of 
global positioning (interchangeable aerial shots of world cities); instantaneous 
transfers of activating information (by cell phone, terminal to terminal, via 
CCTV); opulent cosmopolitan settings (hotels, banks, the beautiful streets of 
Paris, London, New York). In narrative terms, Bourne’s quest for the truth of 
himself is a constant repetition of events or movements, only slightly varied in 
each instance. Similarly, his CIA antagonists obsessively replay the same 
scenario in which they attempt to have him killed, only to have this foiled. 
Repeated too are scenes of drowning/rebirth that begin and end each film. 
A notable and particularly revealing mirror scenario occurs first in 
Identity where Bourne is seen helping Marie dye and cut her hair to assist her in 
evading his CIA antagonists who are now after her too. It is this scene which 
binds Bourne to the world as he is bound to Marie—as equal, as capable of 
love, his humanity restored in his distance from the assassins’ hypermasculine, 
automatonic second nature. In Ultimatum this scene is replayed almost exactly 
with Nicky, the weak, minor agent in the CIA who was charged with tracking 
Bourne but instead helps him escape. However, here, Nicky is shown dying and 
cutting her own hair as Bourne sits deliberately away from her, examining his 
                                                
19 Foucault’s concept of “discourse” (1977) is particularly useful in linking these two aspects of 
human life. Discourses provide us with “regimes of truth” that define what is, or is not, 
thinkable or do-able in any particular context—though discourses are never totalizing and 
always contextual. What this means is that, as Dimen (2011) puts it: 
Discursive formations … are power structures. They are networks of 
socially located ideas, beliefs, behaviors, and action patterns that 
systematically fashion and inform subjectivity and its practices. (Dimen 
2011: 5, qtd. in Epstein 2011)  
20 It is not that we are men and women, but that we become ourselves as men and women as we 
continually perform man and perform woman. In other words, gender is both culturally and 
individually realized through repeated gendered performance. 
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damaged hands. This scene too tells us of Bourne’s outlier masculinity, this 
time in his restraint and his refusal of eroticized voyeurism.21 
Iterative fetishes also punctuate the trilogy. There are the wads of cash, 
the multiple passports, the hidden guns. There is the ubiquitous digital and 
communications technology, with particular reference to multiple screens and 
the cell phone. Indeed, by Ultimatum the cell phone functions as a virtual 
protagonist in its own right, moving the plot—but more than that, rendered as a 
displacing focal object and object of desire, infiltrating the body-affective 
gestures of all the characters and dominating virtually every scene. Finally there 
is the fetishistic preoccupation with the childlike face and flamboyant hair of 
Nicky and the hair and body of the character of Pamela Landy (Bourne’s 
almost-ally in the CIA). This hair, face, and body fetish is a primary site of 
gendered voyeurism in the Mulveyan (1975) sense; it is the quintessential male 
gaze. In Nicky’s case, the camera’s constant fixation on her face and hair 
visually undermines her credibility as a CIA agent, let alone one in charge of 
monitoring and stabilizing the psychological state of the Treadstone assassins, 
as she is identified in Identity. Her hair constantly compromises security; it is 
the visual trope of imminent and immanent next-victimhood. For example, in 
Ultimatum, in a protracted chase scene through the streets and alleyways of 
Marrakesh, her hair stands out as a beacon, calling on the assassin, Desh, and 
allowing him to track her intimately. But for the fetishization of her hair, it 
would be inexplicable that as she runs through a bazaar full of stalls and women 
with scarves, she does not grab one to tie around her head. In Identity, by 
contrast, before the hair-dyeing scene, Bourne asks Marie if she has a scarf, to 
which she replies, “to hide my hair.” That Nicky is still alive and free at the end 
of Ultimatum is thus a twist on what we would generically expect. Indeed, this 
is one of the signals that this story has not ended; the logic of voyeurism 
demands an altogether different fate for her. 
With Pamela Landy, the visual play of the camera on her face and the 
elegant lines of her body work against her position as a major player in the 
CIA. It is a key mode through which she is generically set up as an abject-
object: ineffectual, weak, being played, primed for sacrifice. This camera gaze 
parallels and stands in for the gaze of the other (all male) CIA agents, who plan 
for Landy to take the fall for the Treadstone conspiracy. It is also what breaks 
the affective contract with the audience that would otherwise be positioned to 
understand Landy not merely as a parallel protagonist (she is the character who 
                                                
21 With the character of Nicky, any eroticism on Bourne’s part could only have been voyeuristic 
and objectifying because distinct from his relationship to Marie, he has no attachment to Nicky 
and Nicky could not be his equal. 
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redeems and figures out the mystery of Bourne at the end of Ultimatum) but the 
heroic protagonist. 
Perhaps the most powerful and iconic of the iterative fetishes of Bourne 
are the meticulously choreographed hand-to-hand fight scenes. These scenes 
recur continually in a clash and blur of bodies in motion, rendered, particularly 
in Ultimatum, with hyper-speed intercut editing and jarring sound effects. In 
each such scene, Bourne’s antagonist is another Treadstone assassin. Each is a 
mirror of himself and of the other—equally militarily primed, equally hardened, 
equally impervious to fear or pain, equally flat in affect, equally omniscient. 
This is a hyper-masculinity of a particular sort. It is pathologically iterative, 
born of compulsion. It perseverates. In visual terms, these scenes rehearse a 
fetish of lethal imperative and automatonic affect. The ideal Treadstone agent 
inhabits an eroticized, antagonistic, and agonistic intensity and yet also an 
absence, an evacuation. 
Freud (2006 [1914]) argued that “repetition compulsion” is the attempt 
to repair trauma: 
The forgetting of impressions, scenes, experiences comes down 
in most cases to a process of “shutting out” such things … we 
may say that the patient does not remember anything at all of 
what he has forgotten and repressed, but rather acts it out. He 
reproduces it not as a memory, but as an action; he repeats it, 
without of course being aware of the fact that he is repeating it. 
(pp. 392-394) 
This describes the Bourne journey. And yet, the iterations do not repair, and 
indeed cannot repair. This is signalled pointedly at the end of Ultimatum when 
Bourne is confronted by his choice as David Webb to become Jason Bourne 
and his adamant repudiation of that fact. He says, “I remember. I remember 
everything. I’m no longer Jason Bourne” (emphasis added). This refusal means 
that he can neither integrate nor mourn, and thus his journey is ultimately 
melancholic. He must begin again. 
 
Paranoid/Schizoid Governmentality 
“It changes things, that knowledge, doesn’t 
it?” (Bourne in Supremacy) 
Foucault’s (1980; 2008) concept of governmentality refers to the normative 
exercise and deployment of biopower (the exercise of power over bodies and 
populations) through government and techniques of control; the processes that 
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produce normative political values, institutions, practices. and subjects; the 
production of ideal citizens; technologies of the self (the modes through which 
people enfold themselves in and inhabit particular discourses and regimes of 
truth); and the notion that power is capillary.22 Nikolas Rose (1999 [2nd 
edition]) extends this notion to the governance of the soul—what Mitchell Dean 
(1999) called “govern-mentality.” 
The power described through the concept of governmentality is 
minutely explored in the Bourne films. First, there is the interplay of central, 
distributed, and remote agency, with the CIA on the one hand and its dispersed 
“assets” on the other, all bound in an infiltrating network of electronic 
communications. Defining all of these are the operations of capillary power. In 
human qua human terms, there is a contract of govern-mentality here that 
produces a circuit of moral displacement. The CIA trains and deploys its 
“assets” not only to carry out missions but also to bear the primary moral 
responsibility for them. In turn, Treadstone agents suborn themselves to the 
ethos of the organization, which “frees” them to kill. Thus, the Agency is not 
responsible because the agents act “autonomously”; and the agents themselves 
are not responsible because they are carrying out centrally ordered missions. 
Both “assets” and the CIA move as ostensibly unrestricted agents and yet 
epitomize un-freedom. This is explicit in the interchange between Ted Conklin 
and Jason Bourne when they meet at the end of Identity: 
Bourne: You sent me to kill Wombosi … 
Conklin: … I sent you to be invisible. I sent you because you 
don’t exist.… 
Bourne: I don’t remember what happened in Marseilles.… I 
don’t re— 
Conklin: You brought John Michael Kane to life. You put 
together a meeting with Wombosi. You found the security 
company. You broke into the office. You’re the one who picked 
the yacht as the strike point. You picked the boat. You picked 
the day. You tracked the crew, the food, the fuel. You told us 
where. You told us when. You hid out on that boat five days. 
You were in, Jason. You were in. 
The contract of displacement is further dispersed in the operations of 
informatics. Information flows in logics and circuits unsutured from their 
                                                
22 Power, in Foucault’s understanding, is not monolithic, but rather is everywhere and flows in 
all directions.  
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origins and contexts. At the same time, this dispersed power consolidates and 
converges back to the centre. There is a conceit that even the most minute unit 
of information can be gathered, made sense of, and mastered. Thus, capillary 
power is not just in its dispersal but also in its congealing and in the centrifocal 
collision of bodies, data, and technology. In this context, remoteness is the 
privileged affect; an effect but also constituting the feedback loop of remote 
control and remote agency. This is reiterated in the visual trope of the “remote 
control” mobilization of “assets” as they move from quiescent waiting 
(embodied “sleeper cells”), to activation to their missions. 
Second, the films are visually and narratively composed of myriad 
signifiers of paranoid surveillance. There are intertextual referents to the “war 
on terror” that lend verisimilitude to the narration of the making of Bourne—
graphic scenes of water-boarding and other torture, of indiscriminate murder, of 
hooded prisoners, verbal references to rendition, the evocative panoply of Cold 
War and post-Cold War imagery. There is a sense of enormity and globality on 
the one hand and intimate (but “justified”) intrusion on the other. Thus we 
move from globe-hopping vistas to the ubiquitous wire-tapping of phones, to 
the cameras that perpetually watch all locations (the street outside the Zurich 
bank in Identity, where Bourne meets Marie for the first time; the offices of The 
Guardian newspaper in Ultimatum; the CCTV system at Waterloo Station, also 
in Ultimatum). Agents break into private homes, cars and offices, secret files 
are stolen and read, diaries and notebooks are combed. The CIA headquarters is 
a teeming hive of panopticism. Even Bourne covertly watches Pam Landy in 
her own office. Surveillance, and the anxiety that both produces and is 
produced by it, is thus an absolute and totalizing imperative. 
Third, all of the action takes place through the compaction and 
telescoping of time. This is partly an artefact of cinematic convention (quick-
cut editing, for example) and partly of the cinematic treatment of narrative 
sequence. In the editing of the fight scenes there is a jerking of time that evokes 
a sense of vertigo. Fragmented flashbacks also create a sense of destabilization. 
There is a compression of time with technology, as information is 
instantaneously and continuously transmitted. This temporal seamlessness is, at 
times, jarringly juxtaposed with old-fashioned realist time—Bourne eating 
breakfast with Marie at her ex-boyfriend’s house, dyeing her hair, even the on-
foot rush to get to her car (Identity). The telescoping of time also produces a 
sense of globality and the imminence and immanence of catastrophe. The 
demand for instantaneity is perhaps the most forceful effect, symptom and 
source of paranoid governmentality. The films depict how the projection of 
danger produces the need for now. In turn, the need for now leads inexorably to 
violence, excess, and an unmooring of reason. 
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The character of Noah Vosen (the CIA agent in charge of “cleaning up” 
the Treadstone failure) embodies the escalating stakes inherent in the paranoid 
standpoint. The key early sequence in Ultimatum traces, through Vosen, the 
escalating frustration that moves from a demand to know now23 to a demand 
and an entitlement to kill. When Guardian journalist, Ross, uses the word 
“Blackbriar” on the phone (which, along with all other phones worldwide, is 
being monitored) Vosen and his team at the CIA are instantly alerted. Vosen 
escalates rapidly from seeing Ross as an object of suspicion, to naming him a 
“target,” to ordering his assassination. This is a protracted scene of paranoid 
decompensation. Everything that Vosen does not know about Ross—why Ross 
gets up from his desk, where he is going in Waterloo Station, who he is talking 
to on an untapped and unknown cell phone—further unhinges him. Vosen’s 
activation of the “asset” to kill Ross demonstrates the catastrophic grandiosity 
that is produced by the conjunction of global power and personal paranoia. The 
totalizing tendencies of this conjunction are emblematized in Ross’s complete 
lack of suspicion, despite chasing a story of covert government corruption, that 
simply saying one word on a private cell phone is enough to get him killed. 
Thus, in the Bourne saga, we see the move from paranoid 
governmentality to its logical corollary—the chaotic and schizoid spiral unto 
death. Threat is not simply a sensibility but an active, insistent objective. It is 
constantly present. It is driven. It is pursued. Paranoid governmentality in the 
late modern context carries not only a conceit of omniscience, but also one that 
is vastly leveraged by the capacities of technology. This governmentality 
moreover is defined by prerogative—the entitlement to judge and to act in 
haste. It carries a conceit of justification and an affect of accumulation. Its 
mode, ultimately, is escalation to self-destruction. As Landy protests to Vosen 
(who, in another such heat of the moment has ordered the killing of Nicky): 
Landy: She’s one of our own. You start down this path ... where 
does it end?! (Ultimatum) 
Noah Vosen represents only one of the characters in Bourne on a sociopathic 
spectrum; indeed, sociopathy is the primary character drive of all three films. 
The trilogy is populated by three competing sociopathic subjectivities. First is 
what might be termed the weak-evil character styles of the progenitors and 
leaders of Treadstone: the originator of the programme, Ward Abbott (Brian 
Cox) who is a “Mengele” figure. He designed, presided over, and rationalized 
                                                
23 Vosen: I want all his [Ross, the Guardian journalist’s] phones, his Blackberry, his apartment, 
his car, bank accounts, credit cards, travel patterns.... I want to know what he’s going to think 
before he does. Every dirty little secret he has. And most of all, we want the name and real time 
location his source. 
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Treadstone. He is corrupt, weak of body, avaricious, and slothful. As such he is 
both antagonist and generically set up to be “justifiably” killed, though in this 
instance he kills himself so that he does not have to face up to his moral 
responsibilities. His last words before shooting himself are “I am a patriot,” 
which in the dystopic logic of the film, is a both a confession and denial of 
governmental corruption and criminality. 
A counterpoint within “evil sociopathy” is Albert Hirsch (Albert Finny). 
Hirsch is not personally weak, but is an organizationally subordinated 
character; he does not run Treadstone, but he trains their agents. Within the 
Oedipal drama of Bourne, he is positioned as the bad father. In the logic of the 
plot, Hirsch also serves the function of the Greek chorus, telling us of Bourne’s 
inner turmoil as he comes to himself. He tells Bourne (and us): “You’re 
eventually going to have to face the fact that you chose to be Jason Bourne, 
right here” (Ultimatum). Finally there are the operational leaders of Treadstone, 
most fully developed in the character of Noah Vosen (David Strathairne). 
Vosen is ruthless, but also weak. He is rash and not sufficiently clever, yet has 
an unjustified regard for himself. He is not slothful like Abbot, but totally 
dependent on technology and gadgets to compensate for his inability to master 
and control. His is the epitome of grandiose narcissism. And like Hirsch, he is 
generically set up for comeuppance. 
A second characterization of sociopathy is automatonic. The Treadstone 
agents, who are evacuated of will and personality, embody this form of 
sociopathy. They are not weak; they are expendable. They cause, they are, and 
they stand in for the taken-for-granted, as well as scopophilically pleasurable 
and necessary, collateral damage. Automatonic sociopathy is, more generally, a 
quintessential convention of the Bourne variant of the thriller genre. In this 
convention, audiences are interpellated into an automatonic visual experience 
and an automatonic ethos. Such films are peppered with sequences in which 
violence is graphically rendered and yet distinguished by the camera not 
lingering on the aftermath of or on effects on bystanders. Thus a Guardian 
journalist (Ross) can be assassinated in a public place with the aftermath to 
bystanders and to the social community of Ross (himself a bystander) left 
entirely unexplored. The victims of the spectacularly violent and protracted car 
chase (and crash) sequences remain off camera. Collateral damage in this 
scopophilic logic constitutes a demand and, simultaneously, a denial. Such 
scopophilic pleasures are intensified by the generic demand that certain 
characters are and must be victims. Weakness or lack (whether that lack is 
within a character we know, or our lack of knowledge about the character—
e.g., the dead extra) presage not only victimization, but its rationale and 
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rationalization. In Butler’s terms, these characters are expendable, “faceless,” 
not grievable. Indeed, theirs is a demand for death (1994; 2009). 
Finally, in Jason Bourne, we have the trope of romantic sociopathy. 
This is constituted as a conceit of reconciliation between the possession of 
automatonic power and the capacity for empathetic attachment. The romantic 
sociopath has its antecedents across genres from the Western, to science fiction 
to the thriller. It is the quintessentially American “one man” generic hero. The 
romantic sociopath promises the (wished for) resolution of the automaton’s 
dilemma—not only that the dehumanized subject can maintain his humanity, 
but that his humanity is (can be) enhanced by inhumanity. 
Bourne’s de-suture from his automatonic subject position (he is the 
preeminent Treadstone assassin) is presented as his primal trauma. It is the 
moment, told in fragmented, disorienting flashback, where he cannot fulfil his 
mission; he cannot shoot Wombosi because two children are present. In 
psychoanalytic terms, a primal trauma can be understood as an originary event 
(abuse, violence, neglect) that radically threatens personhood. In Bourne, the 
automaton’s primal trauma is that humanity threatens automatonic subjecthood. 
Thus, Bourne’s trauma arises from a sudden infiltration of empathy, of 
recognition of the humanity of the other. He is suddenly brought to awareness, 
unable to shoot a man in front of his children, unable to maintain his possession 
of himself. Thus, Bourne’s is a trauma of his second nature. He was not born an 
assassin, but made. His particular brand of militarized automatonia can only be 
a socialized nature—hence the scenes of torture and dehumanization, also 
conveyed in flashback, which tell us of the character of training necessary to 
create the weaponized human. 
Underscoring these competing sociopathic characterizations, and of the 
sociopathic standpoint of the Bourne films, are phantasies of omnipotence—of 
omniscience (omni-science), of control, of narcissistic self-justification. Their 
global, technological setting and intrigue driven plot trajectory privilege a 
larger cultural aesthetic organized around governmentality and taken to its 
logical extremes by paranoia. What distinguishes Bourne as a romantic hero, in 
this context, is his apparent break with the hypermasculine aesthetic and 
dehumanizing ethos of this world.24 What distinguishes him as a heroic 
sociopath is the romanticized denial of his investment in being Jason Bourne. 
                                                
24 It is beyond the scope of this paper to more fully interrogate the Bourne films as a gendered 
field. However it is worth noting that the only developed characters who are not sociopathic are 
female. Pamela Landy and Marie Kreutz both in their own ways represent reparation for Bourne 
himself and a route to reparative governance. The far less developed character of Nicky, too, is 
not sociopathic, notwithstanding her location and responsibilities, like Landy, in the CIA. She 
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The Bourne Tragedy 
The semiotic economies of the Bourne trilogy suggest powerfully the 
phantasmatic underpinnings and seductions of bioconvergence and 
bioconvergent governmentality. In this context, convergence works at a number 
of levels. Perhaps most important is verisimilitude. The films depict a totalizing 
digital revolution: an escalating integration, inter alia, of communications 
technology, global positioning, algorithmic data processing, the Internet, and 
digital surveillance. Furthermore, their central plot conceits are located at the 
interstices of digitality, machine, and body. This portrayal is, of course, not a 
fantasy; these convergences are taking place (and indeed, literally made 
possible the making of the movies). At the same time—and in so doing—the 
Bourne films sequence a shift, both generically and phantasmatically, in the 
biopower imaginary. The setting of the Bourne drama on the terrain of covert 
politics and governmentality leverages both the persuasion and the seductions 
of capillary power. Bourne spectacularizes capillary power’s convergent as well 
as dispersive tendencies. Here, metaphors of capital (economic, social, cultural, 
and technological) fill in a place of affective investment. Governmentality puts 
capital in place, holds it in place, and also destroys it—assets are 
simultaneously disposable and perpetual. 
The Bourne trilogy, furthermore, provides a window on the imperatives 
of action, agency, and affect that are emergent in this bioconvergent age. The 
iterative motifs of the trilogy reflect and cultivate a larger cultural conviction of 
the inevitability of convergent biotechnology. The films bespeak a 
bioconvergent bio-ethic, located within but not entirely congruent with 
Nadeson’s description of neoliberal governmentality: 
[Neoliberal g]overnmentality … explores how individuals are 
privileged as autonomous self-regulating agents or are 
marginalized, disciplined or subordinated as invisible or 
dangerous. (Nadesan 2008: 1) 
What the Bourne films suggest is that it is not the autonomous subject that is 
privileged within neoliberal biopower, but the automatonic subject—the subject 
with capital who can performatively embrace his or her subordination as danger 
and discipline. The Bourne tragedy conscripts this late modern cultural 
delusion—the notion that subjectivity, as opposed to subjection, can be secured 
by its obverse. Bourne’s dilemma bespeaks a larger and conflicted cultural 
                                                                                                                             
also is a conduit of escape and survival for Bourne, if not a signifier of an alternative to the 
paranoid/schizoid spiral. 
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unconscious, one that acutely recognizes the totalizing tendencies of the 
bioconvergent imperative, and yet, at the same time, is intransigently persuaded 
by it. 
We began this paper with the suggestion that Jason Bourne embodies 
aspects of both a classical and Shakespearean tragic hero. However, in contrast 
with these earlier figurations, Bourne’s fate is not to die. His tragedy is his 
perpetual entrapment—his repetitive-compulsive need to resolve the trauma not 
just of losing, but indeed, of finding himself. Bourne signals a larger cultural 
melancholia—an existential cultural crisis in which phantasies of omnipotence 
and omni-science elide to drive institutionalities, to privilege unaccountable 
power and to uncouple conscience from consciousness. In this way, Bourne is 
the tragic archetype—the lost subject—of the bioconvergent age. 
 
Coda 
And what you do not know is the only thing you know 
And what you own is what you do not own 
And where you are is where you are not. 
—T.S. Eliot (1940) 
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